2. Democracy, Pluralism and Minorities

Most societies are plural insofar as individuals and their constitutive groups subscribe to different conceptions of the good. The fact that a society is plural, or the doctrine of empirical pluralism, does not however translate by itself into normative pluralism, or the proposition that each of these conceptions are of equal value and should be treated equally. We are not speaking of the choices that people make: that some are meat eaters and other vegetarians, or that some are teetotalers and others believe that a bucolic existence is preferable to a life without alcohol. These preferences constitute ‘thin’ differences because in the light of persuasive arguments, people can be led to change their attitudes. Religious beliefs are, however, ‘thick’ because they provide a worldview for the believer and make her aware of her place in this world and the world hereafter. These beliefs are not easily changed because they constitute an integral way of being human. Religious beliefs should be for that reason honoured. This is the warp and woof of normative pluralism.

Normative pluralism holds that there is no one system of belief against which the validity or the lack thereof can be measured. Pluralism is a value, but one that is different, because it is a condition for the existence of a plurality of conceptions of the good, and because it disavows any kind of grading. If this is so then Habermas’s public sphere should be marked not only by a dialogue between secular and religious-minded citizens, but also between religious groups in the social order. Do all these groups have an equal right to voice in the sphere?

Let us add a twist to the tale. Plural societies are likely to contain majority and minority religious voices. The term majority or minority is not measured in terms of numbers, but in terms of the recognition of these groups and their systems of signification in the public sphere. Minority groups are, for obvious reasons, profoundly vulnerable to the domination of a brute majority. We have learnt from the painful experience of religious conflict in recent history that religious belief is no guarantor of non-violence against people who are considered non-believers. Because they are vulnerable and because their beliefs matter so much to them, minorities and their ways of life have to be protected constitutionally. It is precisely here that the significance of secularism, which has been dismissed by postmodernists and post-secularists, has to be underscored.

Certainly in a democratic society built on the precepts of freedom, equality, and justice, we do not need to proclaim secularism in order to grant religious freedom. This freedom can emerge from, and form part of the fundamental rights that are assured to every citizen. But a secular state cannot stop at granting the right to religion. The principle of secularism goes further and establishes equality between all religious groups. However, equality of religions can also be established via the fundamental right of equality that finds pride of place in democratic constitutions. We, in sum, have to appreciate that the concept of secularism extends beyond the right to freedom and equality and mandates that the state shall not be aligned with any particular religion. Nor shall it pursue any religious project of its own. 

This is essential for two basic reasons. One, the merger of two formidable forms of power – the religious and political – is deeply inimical to the principle of separation of powers that forms the backbone of democratic institutions. Two, the alignment of the state with religion can prove profoundly destabilising for minority groups, because a majoritarian state can threaten their existence and wreck their way of life. A democratic state that is neutral towards all religious groups is the best guarantee of religious minorities.

This does not close the debate on what the status of religious groups in a plural society should be, because another question arises to complicate matters. What does it mean to treat religious groups equally? Does the state stay away from religious beliefs and practices equally? Or does it intervene in the internal affairs of religious groups, for whatever reason, equally? Does not the equal treatment of religious groups reproduce the empirical fact that one of these religious groups is numerically dominant and culturally hegemonic, and that minority groups are at risk because they are vulnerable to assimilation, on the one hand, and domination by the majority, on the other? In other words, does equality imply that minority groups should be granted special protection to their culture and religion in order to protect them against advertent or inadvertent assimilation? What exactly does equality imply?

If we begin to look closely at equality we find that it is by no means a self-evident concept. Whereas in a purely formal sense equality means that each should be treated equally, this interpretation ignores the fact that the constituency of equality of treatment is supremely unequal. If we apply formal equality in an unequal society we land up reproducing inequality, which is something that egalitarians have been warning us against. 

The principle of formal equality does not ensure that individuals or groups in an unequal society have an equal voice in the decisions that a society takes, and each decision counts equally. If opinions clash and the matter is put to a vote, inevitably the minority will lose out, simply because the other group has numbers on its side. Therefore, whereas formal equality dictates that every individual has an equal voice in decision-making, the decision itself registers only the opinions of those who are in a majority. This does not matter in cases of ‘floating majorities’, that is, in the case of voting in elections. For today’s minority can become tomorrow’s majority, providing the context ensures free and fair elections. The majority principle is workable but not morally valid. It is highly detrimental to ‘permanent minorities’ such as religious groups because they will be outvoted every time, particularly if the majority religion takes over political power.

The only antidote to this problem of permanent majorities and minorities is to put minority rights off the political agenda. This means that the rights of a minority to their religious practices, rituals, and beliefs are protected if they are incorporated into the constitution as constitutional rights. Religion, we have learnt, is of vital importance to wellbeing for a good many reasons, from the need to believe to making sense of the world and of ourselves. To deny the members of a group a right to religious beliefs is to deny them the right to live a meaningful life. In other words, the concept and practices of pluralism and democracy are a sufficient condition for the protection of minority rights; they are simply not enough. 

Recognising this conundrum, the Indian Constitution grants the right to religion. Article 25 of the Fundamental Rights chapter of the Constitution makes this quite explicit: subject to public order, morality, and health… all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion. The second section of article 25 states that nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the state from making any law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice, or in providing for social welfare and reform, or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. 

This must be the only case where the right to religion has been prefaced by numerous ifs and buts. But this was essential for two reasons. One, the recurrence of communal riots between Hindus and Muslims over, say, music before the mosque, or cow slaughter, in history, had sent a warning signal. No religious ritual can override social order. Two, the right to religious freedom was embedded in an ambitious programme of social reform. Since most religious communities in India are embedded in caste hierarchies and oppression of the lower castes, the reversal of historical injustice demanded limits on religious practices. The message was quite clear: the modernising agenda of the postcolonial state was not to be compromised by religious practices.  In addition to the freedom of religion, which included the right to be non-religious, the right of minorities to their own culture, scripts, and the right to run their own educational institutions was granted vide article 29 and article 30 of the fundamental rights chapter. In sum, whereas article 25 of part three of the Constitution grants individual rights, articles 29 and 30 recognise groups as bearers of rights.  

The grant of minority rights was in keeping with the basic fear of liberal democrats that majorities are predisposed to trample over the rights of minorities. That is why liberal democrats control majority opinion by laying down constitutional principles, particularly fundamental rights, which trump rules determined by the majority. If this is so, then the grant of minority rights is perfectly legitimate, simply because it protects minorities against majority opinions that may violate the rights of the former. Minority rights are accordingly not a violation of democracy as equality of all religions; they concretise the principle of equality of all persons irrespective of what a majority believes at a particular point in time.