3. Democracy and Secularism: Implications
It follows that secularism makes sense when we relocate the concept in the constitutive context of equality, democracy, rights and freedom. Secularism thus cannot be understood in abstraction from democracy and the attendant principles of equality because it derives its essential meaning from these antecedent moral concepts. Consider that secularism has been historically designed to regulate relationships between the state and groups who subscribe to different religious persuasions. Towards this end all groups are promised equality of treatment, and the state is not aligned to any religion. Correspondingly, no person, no matter what religious denomination she or he may belong to, can be denied full citizenship rights on the grounds of her or his religious affiliation. Equally, the right to benefit from the distribution of goods, such as health, education, a fair wage, and equal protection of the law cannot be withheld from any individual on the same ground. The status and the rights of citizenship are simply abstracted from a person’s affiliations.
If this is so, and if the basic aim of secularism is to secure equality of all religious denominations, the concept of secularism is derived from the principle of equality. Logically there is no reason why a society should be committed to secularism, unless it is committed beforehand to the concept of equality. A prior commitment to the principle of equality is a condition for equality of all religious groups. Conversely the principle of secularism is justified by reference to democratic equality. The justification of secularism by referral to the principle of democratic equality, conceivably, carries three distinct advantages over other justifications of secularism.
One, even if a democratic government is weakly committed to secularism, it cannot but be committed to equality, simply because equality is a constituent feature of the Constitution. This by itself should lead to equality of treatment of all religious groups, which we recollect is the first constituent principle of secularism. In effect, even if a particular government dismisses secularism, it is still bound by the principle of equality, or even the lesser form of equality that is non-discrimination, because it is bound by reasons of democracy. This would mean that if a religious group is discriminated against, or if one religious group is given special privileges because it is in a majority, such discrimination constitutes a violation of the Constitution.
Two, the right to practice one’s own religion is a fundamental and indivisible right. Rights by definition are equally granted to each individual. It is important that individuals possess status in a polity, a status that is guaranteed by the recognition of individual rights. But more importantly, each individual has equal rights, and this principle is inviolable. The virtue of rights is not only that they grant status to each individual but also because they grant equal status to every individual. Equality is built into the very structure of rights talk. Therefore, if the individual right to religious belief is infringed in any manner, the constitution itself is infringed. And since governments as well as groups in civil society are bound by the Constitution, an infringement of constitutional rights carries serious consequences.
Three, the virtue of securing secularism by placing it in the principle of equality is that equality, in a substantive sense, guarantees that minorities are protected against majorities. Moreover, the principle of democratic equality applies to all persons across the board. Therefore, equality is applicable to both inter-group as well as intra-group relations. Secularism, on the other hand, is meant to regulate inter-group relations and not intra-group relations. But it is possible that within the group, individual members may be treated unjustly, and in fact deprived of their individual rights. The case of women’s rights within religious communities can be cited as one such example.
Locating secularism in the principle of democracy and equality will ensure that both inter-group as well as intra-group relations are regulated by the norms of equality. We can defend minority rights in order to protect the minorities against assimilationist agendas. But though opponents of the argument for cultural assimilation and national unity have frequently found themselves defending their occasional support of claims of minority communities, this has exposed them to the charge of collaborating with gender injustice. Defenders of minority rights always lay themselves open to the charge of violating the rights of the individual within the group. Embedding secularism within the precept of equality will help us to resolve this problem that is intrinsic to secularism.
4. Conclusion
The argument above holds that secularism is not a stand-alone concept, but a companion concept of democracy. Whereas secularism mandates that a government shall not harness its projects to a religious agenda, legitimise itself by reference to religious authority, or proclaim a state religion, democracy establishes that non-discrimination and freedom of belief flow from the generic principle of equality and freedom. Discrimination and injustice within groups is tackled through appeals to individual rights and status. Political secularism per se has little to say about inequalities or injustices within religious groups. It is concerned about a weak form of equality, or non-discrimination between religious groups, and ensures that the state should not be aligned to one group, which by this reason acquires dominance. Injustice within groups has to be tackled through the companion concept of secularism that is democracy.
Author
Neera Chandhoke is formerly a Professor of Political Science in Delhi University, India. She is the author of:Democracy and Revolutionary Politics (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015); Contested Secessions: Democracy, Rights, Self-Determination and Kashmir (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012); The Conceits of Civil Society (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003); Beyond Secularism: The Rights of Religious Minorities (Delhi: Oxford University Press; 2003,) and State And Civil Society: Explorations in Political Theory (Delhi: Sage, 1995). She has published widely on democracy, global justice, toleration, and historical injustice. She is currently working on “The Life and Times of Secularism”.